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Remanding Multidistrict Litigation 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch* 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and commentators have long lamented vanishing 
trials, empty courtrooms, and the rise of alternative dispute 
resolution.1 Aggregation—whether through class actions or, as is 
more likely today, multidistrict litigation—contributes steadily to 
disappearing trials and fuels the new paradigm of making and 
enforcing a settlement grid.2 Section 1407, the multidistrict 
litigation statute, allows the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation (“the Panel”) to transfer federal cases with a common 
factual question to the same judge (“the transferee judge”) for 
coordinated pretrial proceedings.3 In theory, after the parties 
complete discovery on common issues and the transferee judge 
rules on pretrial motions that affect the cases uniformly, the judge 
should then remand those cases to their transferor courts for case-
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 1. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: What the Numbers Tell 
Us, What They May Mean, 10 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 3 (2004) (“Moreover, the drop 
in trials has been recent and steep. In the early part of our period, there was an 
increase in federal civil trials, peaking in 1985, when there were 12,529. From 
then to now, the number of trials has dropped by more than 60 percent and the 
portion of cases disposed of by trial has fallen from 4.7 percent to 1.8 percent.”); 
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) 
(tracing the decline of trials in the United States); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where 
Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical 
Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004); Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, 88 A.B.A. 
J. 24 (2002) (questioning whether the increase of settlements, mediation, and 
arbitration will harm the justice system); Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment 
and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1329 (2005) (examining the influence of summary judgment on the trend of 
vanishing trials); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The 
Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 843 (2004) (analyzing the relationship between ADR and declining trials). 
 2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF 
SETTLEMENT 57 (2007). 
 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
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specific discovery and trial.4 Practice, however, has proven to be 
quite different. Multidistrict litigation has frequently been 
described as a “black hole”5 because transfer is typically a one-way 
ticket.6 Indeed, interviews with attorneys who have been heavily 
involved in these cases suggest that “the panel has abdicated its 
proper role by providing no recourse to remedy or to exit an MDL 
black hole.”7 
The numbers lend truth to this proposition. As of 2010, the 
Panel remanded only 3.425% of cases to their original districts.8 
That number dwindled to 3.1% in 2012,9 and to a scant 2.9% in 
                                                                                                             
 4. Id. § 1407(a) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the 
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from 
which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated . . . .”). 
 5. See, e.g., In re U.S. Lines, Inc., No. 97-CIV-6727, 1998 WL 382023, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1998) (explaining appellants’ description of the asbestos 
multidistrict litigation as “a black hole” and “the third level of Dante’s inferno”); 
Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 2323, 2330 (2008) (“Indeed, the strongest criticism of the traditional MDL 
process is that the centralized forum can resemble a ‘black hole,’ into which 
cases are transferred never to be heard from again.”); John G. Heyburn II & 
Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, 38 
LITIGATION 27, 31 (2012) (“The single most prominent complaint about 
multidistrict litigation arises from counsel’s negative experiences in so-called 
black hole cases—those that seem not to move at an acceptable pace.”); Eduardo 
C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation 
(MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L. J. 97, 126 (2013) 
(“Ultimately, neither the court nor the parties were ready, willing, or able to 
move [asbestos] cases to trial and settlement. This stage of litigation led some 
litigants to refer to MDL-875 as a ‘black hole,’ where cases disappeared forever 
from the active dockets of the court.”). 
 6. See, e.g., In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 
1171, 1176 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“In practice, it has been reported, most cases 
transferred under § 1407 are not remanded.”). 
 7. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 31. 
 8. Since Congress created the Panel in 1968, the Panel has centralized 
349,914 civil actions for pretrial proceedings and, as of September 30, 2010, 
transferee courts have terminated 266,264 actions, reassigned 398 actions to 
transferor courts within the transferee district, and remanded 11,986 actions for 
trial. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (2011), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010 
/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/98N2-PH7R. 
 9. “Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has centralized 415,995 civil 
actions for pretrial proceedings. By the end of 2012, a total of 13,065 actions 
had been remanded for trial, 398 had been reassigned within the transferee 
districts, 341,836 had been terminated in the transferee courts, and 60,696 were 
pending throughout 54 transferee district courts.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics 
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2013.10 To put this number in perspective, in 2012, the 
multidistrict litigation docket comprised roughly 15% of all federal 
civil cases.11  
Retaining cases in hopes of forcing a global settlement can 
cause a constellation of complications. These concerns range from 
procedural justice issues over selecting a forum and correcting 
error, to substantive concerns about fidelity to state laws, to 
undermining democratic participation ideals fulfilled through jury 
trials in affected communities. Yet, if transferee judges remanded 
cases after overseeing discovery into common issues, they could 
alleviate those concerns while avoiding inconsistent rulings on 
common questions and streamlining discovery. But transferee 
judges exacerbate these concerns when they disregard two inherent 
limitations on their power.  
First, Congress intended to limit multidistrict litigation’s 
jurisdictional reach to pretrial proceedings.12 The statute’s 
legislative history states that “trial in the originating district is 
generally preferable from the standpoint of the parties and 
witnesses.”13 Accordingly, the statute is designed to “maximize the 
litigant’s traditional privileges of selecting where, when and how 
to enforce his substantive rights or assert his defenses while 
minimizing possible undue complexity from multi-party jury 
trials.”14 This hints at the second limitation. When nationwide 
plaintiffs’ claims are founded on state substantive laws, common 
questions decrease as the differences between states’ laws increase. 
This, in turn, creates a conundrum for transferee courts: applying 
the originating state’s choice-of-law provision as Klaxon15 requires 
                                                                                                             
 
/JudicialBusiness/2012/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation.aspx, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/D65B-ZX5N.  
 10. “Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has centralized 462,501 civil 
actions for pretrial proceedings. By the end of 2013, a total of 13,432 actions 
had been remanded for trial, 398 actions had been reassigned within the 
transferee districts, 359,432 actions had been terminated in the transferee courts, 
and 89,123 actions were pending in 271 multidistrict litigation dockets 
throughout 56 transferee district courts.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Judicial 
Business/2013/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation.aspx, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/MPX2-ETC8. 
 11. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 26. 
 12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
 13. S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 5 (1967). 
 14. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 499 (J.P.M.L. 1968). 
 15. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“The 
conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must 
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is inefficient and challenging, but overlooking those differences to 
facilitate aggregate resolution ignores federalism concerns and 
may raise Erie questions.16 Returning cases to their original 
districts as Congress intended, however, easily solves this 
conundrum.  
Because remand occurs so infrequently, few courts or scholars 
have addressed the topic. This Article thus aims to ignite that 
discussion by explaining the potential advantages of remand, 
arguing that remand’s scarcity is caused by repeat players’ uniform 
interest in settlement and suggesting key junctures for both 
transferee judges and the Panel to disaggregate cases.  
Part I begins by exploring the procedural, substantive, and 
communal benefits of remanding multidistrict litigation. Despite 
the potential upside and persistent “black hole” concerns, statistics 
show that remands rarely occur.17 Part II considers why: remands 
disfavor those with litigation control—transferee judges, lead 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, and defendants. Transferee judges deem 
settlement a hallmark of their success. Lead plaintiffs’ lawyers try 
to increase their fees by inserting fee provisions into settlements. 
Likewise, plaintiffs’ attorneys can bypass doctrinal uncertainties 
over weak claims by packaging plaintiffs together in a global 
settlement. And aggregate settlements allow defendants to resolve 
as many claims as possible in one stroke, take their hit, and return 
to business, which their shareholders view as a net positive. 
Moreover, the remand process itself defers to these vested 
interests. Although the Panel could remand cases at a party’s 
request, in practice it appears never to have done so. Rather, it 
waits for the transferee judge to admit defeat and suggest 
remand—thereby conceding failure.18 
Despite these impediments, there is some evidence that a 
normative shift may be underway. First, the Panel commissioned a 
self-study in 2010 and, upon hearing criticisms about multidistrict 
litigation’s perception as a “black hole,” Judge John G. Heyburn, 
                                                                                                             
 
conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts. Otherwise the accident 
of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of 
justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side.”). 
 16. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Klaxon, 313 U.S. 
at 496 (“We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins, against such independent determinations by the federal courts extends 
to the field of conflict of laws.”). 
 17. See supra notes 8–10; Robreno, supra note 5, at 143–44 (“In reality, as 
it has turned out, for a variety of reasons, once the cases are consolidated they 
rarely are remanded to the transferor court.”). 
 18. See infra Part II.A.3. 
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the Panel’s chief judge, responded that the Panel is “encouraging 
judges to consider remand where their basic work is completed.”19 
Second, Judge Eduardo Robreno, who has presided over the 
federal asbestos multidistrict litigation since 2008, and Judge Mark 
Davidson, who presided over the Texas state court asbestos 
litigation, have both begun disaggregating those cases for trial.20 
Their testimony before the American Bar Association’s TIPS 
Asbestos Task Force led the Reporter and long-time aggregation 
proponent, Georgene Vairo, to question her pro-centralization 
stance and deem “empty courtrooms” a problem.21 She concluded 
that “we need to let go of the ‘make it go away’ and the ‘price of 
doing business’ mentalities that drive all stakeholders—the 
plaintiffs and defense bars, as well as the courts—and return to the 
ideal of ‘letting lawyers be lawyers’ and getting cases ready for 
trial.”22 Finally, the Symposium for which this Article was written, 
“The Rest of the Story: Resolving the Cases Remanded by the 
MDL,” is one of the first of its kind to examine remand and 
explore its implications. 
If a shift toward disaggregating is to occur, however, the “pro-
settlement” norm and “remand-as-a-failure” stigma must change. 
Likewise, transferee judges need guidance on how and when to 
remand. Accordingly, Part III examines the few cases in which 
remand has occurred, proposes ideal times for remanding cases, 
and encourages the Panel to reopen the direct line for parties to 
request remand despite the transferee judge’s reluctance. 
I. WHY REMAND? 
The hurdle for centralizing cases through multidistrict litigation 
is an extraordinarily low one: cases need to share but one common 
question of fact.23 That factual question need not predominate or 
determine the outcome; it simply must exist. Granted, the more 
factual questions that cases share and the more central those 
questions are to the litigation, the more likely the Panel is to 
                                                                                                             
 19. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 32. 
 20. See Robreno, supra note 5, at 127; Georgene Vairo, Lessons Learned by 
the Reporter: Is Disaggregation the Answer to the Asbestos Mess?, 88 TUL. L. 
REV. 1039, 1057–59 (2014); Asbestos Task Force, Transcript of the 
Proceedings, A.B.A. TORT TRIAL AND INS. PRAC. SEC. 18 (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/tips/asbestos_tf/10 
13/13_10_1_asbestos_hearing_transcript.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/4BQS-76KG. 
 21. Vairo, supra note 20, at 1070. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
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transfer and consolidate, but the threshold does not require 
anything close to the “predominance of common questions” 
required for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification. Accordingly, 
conducting discovery as to common questions takes the parties 
only so far; after that, each case will entail case-specific discovery 
on issues like specific causation and elements particular to each 
state’s law.  
Consolidating can thus further some of aggregation’s goals, 
like “promoting the efficient use of litigation resources.”24 But 
given the low threshold for commonality, multidistrict litigation 
can also reach a point of diminishing returns and inhibit the 
enforcement and development of substantive law because 
transferee courts cannot retain cases for trial.25 Consequently, 
remanding these cases once the transferee judge resolves common 
pretrial issues can yield a number of intertwined procedural, 
substantive, and democratic benefits.26  
Procedurally, disaggregating can help correct error by 
bypassing private, global settlements that are inherently non-
appealable, building secondary judicial review into the process and 
incorporating pluralistic fact-finding by jurors on plaintiff-specific 
and state-specific issues. Substantively, if “local”27 judges apply 
familiar state laws and explain the vagaries of those laws to jurors 
from the relevant community, it should produce greater accuracy, 
less error, and increased fidelity to state laws. Moreover, 
considering statewide classes and conducting trials in affected 
communities can ease the regulatory mismatch between 
defendants’ behavior, which affects citizens nationwide; transferee 
courts, which have nationwide authority over pretrial matters only; 
and a state’s laws, which govern defendants’ conduct toward its 
citizens. The following paragraphs explain these advantages in 
more detail. 
First, remanding cases would increase error-correction 
opportunities. When transferee judges refuse to remand to goad 
parties into settling, they leave parties with few avenues for 
appellate review. Erroneous decisions can persist, and the judge 
                                                                                                             
 24. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 
1.03 (2010). 
 25. The Supreme Court’s Lexecon decision held that transferee judges could 
not transfer cases to themselves for trial. See generally Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg 
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). Of course, the transferee 
judge could try cases filed in his or her own district or with the parties’ consent. 
 26. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 
681–87 (2013) [hereinafter Burch, Disaggregating]. 
 27. By “local,” I mean federal transferor judges sitting within the state 
whose laws will control the dispute’s outcome. 
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will have eviscerated plaintiffs’ attorneys’ most powerful 
bargaining chip: the threat of trial.28 Unlike class action 
settlements, private aggregate settlements are not appealable. And, 
as I have explored elsewhere,29 aggregate settlements may include 
coercive terms designed to further controlling stakeholders’ 
interests at the expense of non-lead attorneys and plaintiffs. 
Because most interim rulings leading up to settlement are not 
dispositive, they are reviewable only through an extraordinary writ 
of mandamus or subsequent dismissal.30 Even if an appellate court 
grants mandamus or reviews a dismissed case, it tends to do so 
using the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.31 
By contrast, remanding cases to their transferor districts—and 
even consolidating those cases on a statewide basis32—would build 
judicial redundancy into the process.33 Although transferor judges 
receiving remanded cases should not routinely revisit pretrial 
                                                                                                             
 28. Plaintiffs often use the threat of trial “to press for a better offer,” so 
when this is taken away as a realistic opportunity, individual counsel may be 
“disarmed.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997). See 
also NAGAREDA, supra note 2, at 19–20 (“[M]ass tort plaintiffs’ lawyers have 
only one real bargaining chip, but it is a big one: their power to take cases to 
trial. Trial dates are scarce resources. Their availability is limited by the capacity 
of the judicial system.”). 
 29. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 512–14 (2011); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
[hereinafter Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation].  
 30. Transferee judges tend to issue “Lone Pine” orders after most plaintiffs’ 
cases are resolved through a comprehensive settlement. These orders require 
non-settling claimants to submit specific proof regarding their injuries to avoid 
dismissal. See Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986); see, e.g., Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 
F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 31. See In re Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 540, 542–43 (5th Cir. 1992). 
Dismissals under Rule 16(f) are reviewed using the abuse of discretion standard. 
See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 
(1976) (“The question, of course, is not whether this Court, or whether the Court 
of Appeals, would as an original matter have dismissed the action; it is whether 
the District Court abused its discretion in so doing.”); see, e.g., In re Vioxx 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 F. App’x 391 (5th Cir. 2010) (using the abuse-of-
discretion standard in reviewing the allegation that Judge Fallon should have 
recused himself based on his dual roles as judge and Chief Administrator of the 
Master Settlement Agreement). 
 32. For a proposal along these lines, see Burch, Disaggregating, supra note 
26, at 687–93. 
 33. On the benefits of judicial redundancy, see Robert M. Cover, The Uses 
of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 639, 646–57 (1981), and Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the 
Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369 (2008).  
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rulings,34 they will inevitably have to expand, modify, or vacate 
certain orders affecting trial. As the Multidistrict Litigation Manual 
suggests, transferor courts can alter and vacate “earlier rulings so 
long as there is a good reason to do so.”35 Although the law-of-the-
case doctrine underscores these parameters,36 remanding cases 
allows transferor courts to evaluate state-specific questions and 
correct transferee judges’ misinterpretations,37 as well as decide 
questions that transferee judges declined to determine.38 Because 
                                                                                                             
 34. See Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 
Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 577 (1978). 
 35. DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 10.17 (Westlaw 
2014). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.133 (4th ed. 2004) 
(“Although the transferor judge has the power to vacate or modify rulings made 
by the transferee judge, subject to comity and ‘law of the case’ considerations, 
doing so in the absence of a significant change of circumstances would frustrate 
the purposes of centralized pretrial proceedings.” (citing Weigel, supra note 
34)); In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Under the law 
of the case doctrine and general principles of comity, a successor judge has the 
same discretion to reconsider an order as would the first judge, but should not 
overrule the earlier judge’s order or judgment merely because the later judge 
might have decided matters differently.” (quoting United States v. O’Keefe, 128 
F.3d 885, 891 (5th Cir. 1997))). 
 36. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432 
(3d Cir. 2009) (vacating and remanding the transferee judge’s decision to vacate 
the transferor judge’s decision to compel arbitration because it violated the law 
of the case); In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d at 411 (“[T]ransferor courts should 
use the law of the case doctrine to determine whether to revisit a transferee 
court’s decision.”); In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 653 F.2d 671, 678 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying the law of the case to multidistrict litigation). 
 37. This gives transferor courts a sound reason for revisiting the question. 
See In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d at 411–12 (“The law of the case doctrine 
requires that courts not revisit the determinations of an earlier court unless ‘(i) 
the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, (ii) controlling 
authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, 
or (iii) the decision was clearly erroneous and would work . . . manifest 
injustice.’” (quoting Propes v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 2009))). 
In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., the Supreme Court has 
explained the discretionary scope of the law of the case: 
A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a 
coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should 
be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as 
where the initial decision was “clearly erroneous and would work a 
manifest injustice.” 
486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 
(1983)). See Gottschall v. Crane Co., 2014 WL 5025725, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Oct. 8, 2014) (holding that the transferee judge’s interpretation of California law 
was incorrect in regusing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel “to bind a 
California litigant to a principle of law adopted in the prior foreign court 
litigation”). 
 38. See, e.g., In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 276 F.R.D. 336, 347 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (declining to certify a class due to 
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some transferee judges refuse to rule on summary judgment 
motions that implicate state laws,39 remand likewise offers parties 
an opportunity to air substantive disputes, proceed to trial, and 
appeal—if warranted. 
Second, remanding cases can ease the substantive burdens 
caused by aggregating state-law claims with minimal commonality. 
When transferee judges consider state-law claims (such as product 
liability, consumer protection, fraud, warranty, and unjust 
enrichment) from around the country, they are confronted with 
sticky choice-of-law questions, particularly when plaintiffs request 
class certification. To make these classes seem manageable and 
ostensibly avoid choice-of-law problems, plaintiffs may contend 
that a single state’s law should apply,40 try to shoehorn state-law 
claims into a federal cause of action like RICO,41 or suggest that 
the differences in state laws can be grouped into a few 
subclasses.42 Plaintiffs may likewise forgo personal injury claims 
that implicate individual questions, which can jeopardize class 
members’ ability to pursue those claims later.43 But, as some courts 
recognize, when issues are state-specific and do not affect all of the 
cases, transferor judges are best equipped to decide them.44 
                                                                                                             
 
the “vagaries of multiple jurisdictions” but suggesting that transferor judges 
could revisit the issue of whether “a statewide class is appropriate”). 
 39. See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
1014, 1997 WL 109595, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1997) (declining to rule on 
summary judgment motions because the transferee court “would be putting itself 
in the shoes of the transferor courts”). 
 40. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 
F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 41. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 42. See, e.g., Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2007); Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 285 S.W.3d 634 (Ark. 2008). Sometimes transferee 
judges will have plaintiffs file a master complaint in the transferee forum and 
then use that complaint to apply the laws of the transferee court’s forum state. 
E.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d 
1069, 1078 (S.D. Ind. 2001). Most judges disagree with this approach. See, e.g., 
In re Conagra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 692–93 (N.D. 
Ga. 2008); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 
489 F. Supp. 2d 932, 934–36 (D. Minn. 2007); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 
239 F.R.D. 450, 454–55 (E.D. La. 2006). 
 43. E.g., Colindres v. QuietFlex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347 (S.D. Tex. 2006); 
Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex. 
1999). 
 44. In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods. Liab. Litig., 276 
F.R.D. 336, 339 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (“Plaintiffs essentially ask the undersigned to 
decide, for instance, that a class of Washington consumers should be certified 
for trial in the Western District of Washington. This issue affects only a few 
cases, and relates to the manner in which the case will be tried. It is not an issue 
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Remanding cases to these judges would allow those most familiar 
with state law to determine whether to certify statewide classes.45 
In this way, remand could alleviate some of the tension 
between multidistrict litigation and basic federalism principles.46 
As Larry Kramer has observed, when states differ about what 
parties’ rights should be, those differences “are not a ‘cost’ of the 
system; . . . They are its object, something to be embraced and 
affirmatively valued.”47 But multidistrict litigation can muddy 
states’ laws through settlement. All-encompassing settlements may 
water down state-law variations to make it easier to administer 
claims, which can allow plaintiffs with weak or invalid claims 
under their states’ law to receive compensation at others’ expense.  
Conducting bellwether trials before settlement helps to 
establish claim values, but transferee courts are limited to trying 
cases either originally filed in that district or by the parties’ 
consent.48 Thus, bellwether trials before citizens of a single 
transferee forum (that often apply that forum’s substantive laws) 
may do little to maintain substantive distinctions between state 
laws or test those variations before the citizens that helped enact 
them.  
Jury trials are, after all, meant to bring a community’s diverse 
perspectives and norms to bear on fact finding. Communities—
even within a single state—can vary dramatically. Given the 
plurality of viewpoints and experiences within our country, it is no 
surprise that jurors may approach the adjudicative and deliberative 
process dissimilarly even with regard to the same product or 
                                                                                                             
 
that the undersigned should dictate to the transferor courts, but is an issue that is 
more appropriately decided by the judges charged with presiding over the 
trial.”); In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 
77 (D. Me. 2011) (“[T]he transferor courts, each of which is familiar with the 
state law of their respective jurisdictions, are in a better position to assess the 
parties’ state law arguments and their impact on the class certification issue.”). 
 45. In re Bisphenol-A (BPA), 276 F.R.D. at 347 (“Once the cases are 
returned to the transferor courts, relatively little effort will be needed for 
Plaintiffs to pursue individual suits. There is also the prospect that one or more 
transferor courts will conclude—without the vagaries of multiple jurisdictions to 
worry about and a greater familiarity with that state’s law—that a statewide 
class is appropriate.”). 
 46. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 
1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 47. Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
547, 579 (1996). 
 48. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 
40 (1998). 
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action.49 As many debates illustrate—think immigration or gun 
control, for example—plural communities fall along a broad 
spectrum when it comes to moral views and social values. So, 
although bellwether trials in the transferee forum provide the 
public and the nonparticipating plaintiffs a glimpse into the 
contested issues, without remand, multidistrict litigation can 
undermine democratic values of communal participation and fact 
finding by citizens nationwide.50  
At its core, this bespeaks a problem of regulatory mismatch 
between transferee courts’ limited decisional authority and the 
scope of behavior they attempt to regulate. As Professors 
Issacharoff and Nagareda explained, “a regulatory mismatch may 
occur whenever the authority charged with overseeing some 
economic activity has jurisdiction that is smaller than the conduct 
to be regulated.”51 For example, a variant of this concern led 
Congress to enact the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and 
thereby prevent a single state court from regulating an industry’s 
nationwide conduct under its own state law.52  
But CAFA contributed to the mismatch in multidistrict 
litigation when states’ laws provide the decisional authority. 
Transferee judges now have federal, pretrial jurisdiction over many 
would-be state class actions, but they cannot try those cases. And, 
because there is no federal law governing product liability, for 
example, they cannot resolve those cases with anything other than 
state law. As transferee judges often admit, they are not the 
foremost authority on how to apply other states’ laws.53 So, absent 
remanding cases to their transferor courts,54 the nationwide scope 
                                                                                                             
 49. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes 
Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 864–81 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Rights 
and Their Critics, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 745 (1995) (“[The right to a 
jury trial] ensures a role for the community in adjudicative proceedings.”). 
 50. Burch, Disaggregating, supra note 26, at 685–87. 
 51. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under 
Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1674 (2008). 
 52. Id. at 1674–75. 
 53. In re Activated Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing Mktg. & Sales 
Practices Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (D. Minn. 2012) (“‘[T]he transferor 
courts, each of which is familiar with the state law of their respective 
jurisdictions, are in a better position to assess’ these claims.” (quoting In re 
Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Me. 
2011))). See Light Cigarettes Case, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (“[T]he transferor 
courts . . . are in a better position to assess the parties’ state law arguments and 
their impact on the class certification issue.”). 
 54. Transferee judges have requested that the Panel remand cases so that 
transferor judges can consider whether to certify statewide classes. See, e.g., In 
re Light Cigarettes Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1331 
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of a transferee judge’s authority to handle pretrial matters is ill-
suited to resolve state causes of action through trial or wholesale 
class certification.55 Settlement is the only option. But settlement 
substitutes difficult choice-of-law questions for consent and buries 
differences in the claims administration process. 
II. IMPEDIMENTS TO REMAND 
As is the trend in all civil cases, most multidistrict litigation 
settles.56 This is perhaps the principal reason behind the low 
remand rate, at least once the judge decides dispositive motions. 
As the trend in civil settlements suggests, by one token, 
multidistrict litigation settlements are nothing extraordinary. But 
the pressures prompting these settlements are far from 
conventional. Indeed, the incentive structure for controlling 
stakeholders (lead plaintiffs’ attorneys, defendants, and transferee 
judges) and the procedural requirements for remand are stacked so 
heavily in favor of settlement that remanding even 2.9% of cases is 
remarkable. 
A. Remand Contravenes Repeat Players’ Vested Interests 
There comes a point in nearly every multidistrict litigation 
where controlling stakeholders’ interests converge upon 
settlement. These stakeholders include plaintiffs’ lead lawyers 
(lead counsel, steering committees, liaison counsel, etc.), 
defendants and their attorneys, and transferee judges—people who 
are often repeat players.57 Appointing lead lawyers wrests 
decision-making authority away from plaintiffs’ individually 
chosen counsel and places it in the hands of lawyers who are often 
known as settlement artists—not trial attorneys. These lead 
lawyers control everything from discovery to settlement 
                                                                                                             
 
(J.P.M.L. 2012) [hereinafter Light Cigarettes Case JPML Remand Order] 
(remanding cases involving putative statewide classes involving “only claims 
brought under the law of each plaintiff’s respective state”); In re Chrysler LLC 
2.7 Liter V-6 Engine Oil Sludge Prods. Liab. Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 
(J.P.M.L. 2009) (suggesting that the transferee judge might remand cases for 
class certification consideration). 
 55. Issue classes targeted at the defendant’s conduct might, however, be 
another possibility. 
 56. Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150–51 
(2006). 
 57. Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 29 (manuscript at 
22–25). 
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negotiations. Because plaintiffs have no option to “opt out” of 
multidistrict litigation and only regain control of their lawsuit in 
the unlikely event of remand, they are hostages to the controlling 
stakeholders’ interests.58 And, as this Section describes, settlement—
not remand—furthers the existing power structure’s interests, which 
explains why transferee judges have used remand as a threat to 
bring stakeholders to the negotiating table.59  
1. Lead Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Interests 
Lead lawyers have two income sources in multidistrict 
litigation: contingent fees from their own clients and court-ordered 
“taxes” from plaintiffs who benefit from their efforts. As to the 
former, the tendency to settle in all contingent-fee cases has been 
well documented,60 and lead lawyers are arguably no more 
incentivized to settle than non-lead lawyers on those grounds. But 
common benefit fees—the taxes from non-clients’ cases—are a 
different matter altogether. The emerging common law surrounding 
these fees is an unpredictable hodgepodge of legal doctrines and 
piecemeal rationales.61 Global settlements have thus begun to offer 
lead lawyers an ethically questionable route around this uncertainty. 
Because the judge gives them power to negotiate on plaintiffs’ 
behalf, lead lawyers have started brokering deals that incorporate 
their fee awards into settlement provisions.62 
                                                                                                             
 58. See BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & CATHERINE R. BORDEN, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., MANAGING MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES 48 
(2011) (“Remember that in any products liability MDL, it is often the individual 
plaintiff who may be inconvenienced the most by the inclusion of his or her 
action in the centralized proceedings.”). 
 59. See Jeremy T. Grabill, The Pesky Persistence of Class Action Tolling in 
Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 433, 440 (2014) (“In the MDL 
context, given the threat of remand that the MDL statute confers upon transferee 
courts, it is inevitable that a time will come when the parties begin thinking about 
a potential global settlement.”); Kurt Orzeck, Judge Delays Wind-Down in MDL 
over Merck’s Fosamax, LAW 360 (Oct. 4, 2013, 3:59 PM), https://www.law 
360.com/articles/478316/judge-delays-wind-down-in-mdl-over-merck-s-fosamax, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q9ZG-9BSP; Julie A. Steinberg, Merck Agrees to $28 
Million Settlement to Resolve Fosamax Jawbone Decay Suits, Class Action Litig. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 1482 (Dec. 13, 2013). 
 60. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in 
Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1293 (2012). 
 61. Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 29 (manuscript at 
33–34). 
 62. Id. (manuscript at 57–60). I have argued elsewhere that compensating 
lead lawyers on a quantum-meruit basis would help alleviate these doctrinal 
problems. Id. 
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For example, in Guidant, Vioxx, and the Genetically Modified 
Rice Litigation, lead lawyers inserted terms into global settlements 
that increased their fees and required settling plaintiffs to waive 
their fee objections if they wanted to enroll in the settlement.63 
Lead lawyers combine these terms with other provisions that give 
defendants the right to withdraw the offer if too few plaintiffs sign 
up, and require plaintiffs’ attorneys to recommend their clients take 
the deal or withdraw from representing them.64 Terms like these 
raise the prospect that consent is less than voluntary—even in an 
era that has embraced contracts of adhesion and mandatory 
arbitration.65 But, regardless of one’s views on consent, turning a 
blind eye to the plain risk of structural collusion presented when 
lead lawyers negotiate their fees with defendants is an entirely 
different matter.66  
When lead lawyers want to avoid the doctrinal uncertainty 
surrounding their fees via settlement, they hand defendants a 
meaningful bargaining chip. Defendants care little about how a 
lump sum is divvied up among plaintiffs and their attorneys,67 but 
they can demand significant concessions in return. As Professors 
Silver and Miller pointed out, “[t]he defendant is happy to offer 
[lead attorneys] ‘red-carpet treatment on fees’—higher common 
benefit fees cost the defendant nothing—in return for other things, 
                                                                                                             
 63. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 
05–1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008), amended in part, 
MDL 05-1708, 2008 WL 3896006 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008); In re Vioxx Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. La. 2008), on reconsideration in part, 
650 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. La. 2009); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 
No. 4:06-MD-1811 CDP, 2010 WL 716190, at *9–11 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2010) 
(creating a common benefit fund). See MDL Settlement Agreement, Genetically 
Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06-MD-1811 CDP, 2010 WL 716190 [hereinafter 
MDL Settlement Agreement].  
 64. See, e.g., Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL-1657, No. 05-01657 para. 
1.2.8.1 (E.D. La.) (initial settlement agreement), available at http://www 
.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement_Agreement.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/R7 VS-B34K. After some plaintiffs’ attorneys contended the 
settlement conflicted with ethical rules, it was reinterpreted to mean that the 
attorneys should recommend the deal only if it was in the client’s best interest. 
Alex Berenson, Lawyers Seek to Alter Settlement Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
21, 2007, at C4. 
 65. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 66. Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 29. 
 67. See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 
58 KAN. L. REV. 979, 1010 (2010) (describing the problems caused by lump-sum 
settlements). 
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such as a smaller settlement fund, a later funding date, or a higher 
participation threshold.”68  
Absent a global settlement, lead lawyers stumble into less 
charted territory. Although transferee judges often establish 
common funds from which to pay lead lawyers, the percentage and 
calculation methods can vary dramatically.69 Judges tend to 
analogize to the class action’s common fund doctrine and borrow from 
contract principles, ethics, and equity.70 And because compensation 
arguably rests on an unjust enrichment theory—that non-lead attorneys 
have received something of value for which they have not paid—
negotiating a global settlement surely makes that argument more 
palatable for both lead lawyers and judges.  
Global settlements may likewise encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
file weak claims. Known as the “Field-of-Dreams” problem—“If you 
build it, they will come”—multidistrict litigation coaxes claimants out 
of the woodwork regardless of their claim’s strength in hopes of 
initially staying buried under mounting cases then cashing in on 
settlement.71 Global settlements encourage this phenomenon when the 
claims administration process grinds together high and low value 
claims and under- or overcompensates them respectively. The 
incentives fueling this problem vary from attorney to attorney: some 
might file questionable cases to increase fees, particularly after their 
fees are reapportioned to lead lawyers, while others might file a legion 
of undifferentiated claims in hopes of garnering a leadership role.72 
Whatever the rationale, so long as remand—and testing cases through 
trial—remains an unrealistic probability, aggregating cases will 
perpetuate a find, bind, and grind mentality.  
If remand became the norm rather than the exception, it could 
alleviate the Field-of-Dreams problem. Attorneys hoping to free ride 
on lead lawyers’ efforts by filing undifferentiated claims may dismiss 
weak claims if faced with trial. And if remand became routine, it 
might deter attorneys from filing questionable claims in the first place. 
Then, if settlement occurred pre-remand, claimants with strong claims 
                                                                                                             
 68. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of 
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 107, 134 (2010). 
 69. Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 29 (manuscript at 
28–30). 
 70. Id. (manuscript at 28). 
 71. Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL? A Defense Perspective, 24 
LITIGATION 43, 45 (1998). 
 72. Having a large inventory of cases may make the attorney seem like a 
power broker such that the judge appoints her to a leadership position. Burch, 
Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 29 (manuscript at 5). 
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would stand a better chance of receiving compensation commensurate 
with their claims’ strength.  
2. Defendants’ Interests 
Defendants often stand to gain the most through centralization 
and global settlement.73 Multidistrict litigation dislodges plaintiffs 
from their chosen fora, forces plaintiffs lawyers (who have 
reputations for not hunting well in packs) to battle for lead 
positions, and renders trials a very distant threat. Centralization 
likewise advantages defendants by making meaningful closure 
possible through a global settlement. 
Granted, it goes without saying that defendants would prefer to 
have all the cases against them dismissed. But once they lose 
dispositive motions and can assess the universe of claims before 
them, they tend to think about ways to achieve the maximum 
amount of finality for the lowest possible price. Class actions once 
served this interest moderately well, but even “settlement 
classes”74 have become increasingly difficult to certify in litigation 
where individual issues outnumber common ones, like in product 
liability or other mass tort cases.75 Thus, in some cases like Vioxx, 
defendants used innovative measures and coercive settlement 
tactics to achieve at least an 85% closure rate.76 
This need for finality, which investors demand, explains 
defendants’ near-uniform opposition to remanding cases for trial.77 
                                                                                                             
 73. See, e.g., Herrmann, supra note 71, at 44 (noting that multidistrict 
litigation proceedings give defendants time to “organize a defense, negotiate a 
global settlement, or file a bankruptcy proceeding”). Likewise, multidistrict 
litigation proceedings can precipitate the filing of weak claims and make 
discovery limits difficult. Id. at 45–46. 
 74. See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 981–87 (2014) (explaining why even negotiated 
settlements in cases not yet certified as classes can be problematic). 
 75. Burch, Disaggregating, supra note 26, at 673–76. 
 76. See supra note 61. 
 77. See, e.g., In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. 
Supp. 2d 74, 76 (D. Me. 2011) (noting that the defendants opposed the 
plaintiffs’ motion for remand because “class certification is a pretrial issue that 
the Court should resolve in order to achieve the substantial efficiencies 
contemplated by the JPML’s reference”); Light Cigarettes Case JPML Remand 
Order, supra note 54 (denying the defendant’s request that the Panel vacate its 
order remanding the cases to their respective transferor courts); In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1663, 2009 WL 1874085 (D.N.J. June 30, 
2009) [hereinafter Brokerage Case June Opinion] (noting the defendants’ 
opposition to remand request); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 
1663, 2009 WL 580238, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2009) (“Defendants vigorously 
oppose the instant [remand] motion, and assert that U-Haul should remain a 
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Remanding cases, whether for individual treatment or state-specific 
class actions, makes it much harder to corral and extinguish claims 
through a global settlement. Rather than dealing with a centralized 
authority like the plaintiffs’ steering committee, defendants are 
forced to negotiate with disparate attorneys and lobby against 
piecemeal, statewide class actions that offer all of the downsides and 
none of the finality-related upsides of global settlements.78 
3. Transferee Judges’ Interest 
Finally, transferee judges have an interest in pushing parties to 
settle. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 expressly authorizes 
judges to facilitate settlement discussions.79 As pretrial judges, 
transferee judges would be remiss not to encourage these 
conversations. Yet, as Judge Jack Weinstein has observed, 
“Federal judges tend to be biased toward settlement. . . . We clean 
the dishes and cutlery so they can be reused for the long line of 
incoming customers. Settlements are the courts’ automatic washer-
dryers.”80 Thus, this pro-settlement stance has become standard 
                                                                                                             
 
party to MDL 1663 for a variety of reasons.”); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corp. Qui Tam Litig. (No. II), 560 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1350 (J.P.M.L. 2008) 
(rejecting the defendants’ arguments that remand is premature); In re Managed 
Care Litig., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1347 (J.P.M.L. 2006) (remanding a case over 
the defendants’ objections); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 
1196, 1197 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (noting the defendant’s opposition to remand 
because “this case will move more expeditiously if it remains part of the 
MDL”). 
 78. Light Cigarettes Case JPML Remand Order, supra note 54 
(“Defendants also contend that ordering remand now would permit plaintiffs to 
‘game the system.’ They argue, in other words, that if plaintiffs in future MDLs 
prevail on exemplar class certification rulings made by the respective transferee 
courts, they will seek to have those rulings applied to all pending and future 
related class actions, but, where certification is denied, plaintiffs in the non-
exemplar cases will simply move for a suggestion of remand and thus seek a 
second bite of the apple before the transferor courts.”). 
 79. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5). 
 80. Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement 
(1984), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1265 (2009). See also In re Nineteen 
Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 
603, 605 (1st Cir. 1992) (observing that the JPML consolidated cases in front of 
Judge Raymond Acosta, but “[s]hortly thereafter, the Chief Justice appointed the 
Honorable Louis C. Bechtle as a ‘settlement judge,’” such that while Judge 
Acosta advanced the litigation toward trial, “Judge Bechtle endeavored to 
advance settlement prospects by determining individual and aggregate values for 
the cases”); Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? 
Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer 
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operating procedure for transferee judges. Judge Eldon Fallon 
conceded as much:  
The MDL transferee court theoretically oversees the 
discovery aspect of the case and remands various cases 
back to the transferor courts for further proceedings. In 
practice, however, it is not unusual for the transferee court 
to conduct bellwether trials and encourage a global 
resolution of the matter before recommending to the Panel 
that the case be remanded.81 
According to this view, settlement is the solution and remand is a 
last resort. 
Given this perspective, it is not surprising that both the Panel 
and transferee judges lamented the Supreme Court’s Lexecon 
decision. Lexecon forbade transferee judges from transferring cases 
to themselves for trial, and thus impeded settlement.82 As former 
Panel chairman Judge William Terrell Hodges observed, “It would 
obviously be a lot more efficient if the transferee judge had the 
authority to try the cases that remain. That would add another 
settlement tool into the calculus that normally produces settlement 
anyway.”83 
So, even though coaxing settlement strays furthest from a 
judge’s adjudicative role,84 it is not a secret that transferee judges 
(like most federal judges) are pro-settlement.85 But, as Judge 
William Young explained, “the ‘settlement culture’ for which the 
federal courts are so frequently criticized is nowhere more 
prevalent than in MDL practice.”86 As he notes:  
                                                                                                             
 
Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2288–89 (2008) (discussing settlement bias in 
multidistrict litigation). 
 81. Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 
LA. L. REV. 371, 373–74 (2014). 
 82. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 
35 (1998).  
 83. Gregory Hansel, Extreme Litigation: An Interview with Judge Wm. 
Terrell Hodges, Chairman of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 19 
ME. B.J. 16, 21 (2004). 
 84. Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 
YALE L.J. 27, 43 (2003). 
 85. See Marcus, supra note 80, at 2272; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (urging Congress to expand the 
Class Action Fairness Act to promote final, global resolution of mass disputes). 
 86. Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D. 
Mass. 2006). 
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The Manual for Complex Litigation seems virtually to 
command this result: One of the values of multidistrict 
proceedings is that they bring before a single judge all of 
the federal cases, parties, and counsel comprising the 
litigation. They therefore afford a unique opportunity for 
the negotiation of a global settlement. Few cases are 
remanded for trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in 
the transferee court. As a transferee judge, it is advisable to 
make the most of this opportunity and facilitate the 
settlement of the federal and any related state cases.87 
This directive only partially explains the added settlement push 
in multidistrict litigation. Transferee judges also receive less 
obvious, self-interested benefits from settling high-profile cases. 
For example, the Panel views quickly settling a complex case as a 
hallmark of success that favorably disposes it to reward that judge 
with a new assignment.88 Multidistrict litigations are plum judicial 
assignments; they involve interesting facts, media attention, and 
some of the nation’s most talented attorneys. Given that only 
around 27% of active judges and 20% of senior judges receive 
these assignments, federal judges often “campaign” for them.89 
Conversely, failing to resolve cases quickly can subject 
transferee judges to scrutiny from the Panel.90 As Judge Eduardo 
Robreno, who handled the asbestos multidistrict litigation, observed, 
“As a matter of judicial culture, remanding cases is viewed as an 
acknowledgement that the MDL judge has failed to resolve the case, 
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. at 150–51 (emphasis in original) (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION § 20.132 (4th ed. 2004)). 
 88. This observation is based principally on conversations I have had with 
federal judges and their clerks, the general perception that judges who receive 
these cases are especially capable, and the prestige and publicity that generally 
accompanies such an assignment. See generally Susan Willett Bird, The 
Assignment of Cases to Federal District Court Judges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 475, 
482 n.42 (1975) (reporting that related cases were “assigned specifically to 
Judge X . . . because he was ‘especially able’”); DAVID F. HERR & NICOLE 
NAROTZKY, AM. LAW INST., THE JUDICIAL PANEL’S ROLE IN MANAGING MASS 
LITIGATION 249, 299 (2008) (“The Panel undoubtedly considers the ability and 
reputation of a judge in determining whether to assign complex, multidistrict 
litigation to him or her. . . . In one case, [the Panel] expressly identified former 
Panel membership, as well as leadership roles in various federal court 
committees as a reason for selecting Chief Judge Sam Pointer as a transferee 
judge.”). 
 89. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 30. 
 90. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Judge John G. Heyburn II, the chair of the Panel, 
as saying, “[T]he panel did undertake a study of approximately 40 of our oldest 
dockets to look for any common problems. From this study, we have identified 
certain areas of concern and communicated these to our transferee judges as a 
group”). 
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by adjudication or settlement, during the MDL process.”91 So, 
transferee judges have their own professional and reputational 
incentives to broker deals and thwart remand. 
B. Remand Procedures Defer to Vested Interests  
Current procedures for requesting and effectuating remand to 
transferor courts serve chiefly to reinforce controlling stakeholders’ 
interests. Even if they wanted to, transferee judges have no power to 
remand cases directly to transferor courts.92 They must instead 
suggest that the Panel remand the cases.93 And although parties may 
make remand requests directly to the Panel,94 the Panel appears 
never to have granted a request without first receiving the transferee 
judge’s blessing.95 Despite judges lobbying for multidistrict 
                                                                                                             
 91. Robreno, supra note 5, at 144. 
 92. In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161, 165 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 93. In re Roberts, 178 F.3d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1999); In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
 94. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 
Rule 10.1(b), 277 F.R.D. 480 (2011). Rule 10.1(b) states: 
Initiation of Remand. Typically, the transferee judge recommends 
remand of an action, or a part of it, to the transferor court at any time 
by filing a suggestion of remand with the Panel. However, the Panel 
may remand an action or any separable claim, cross-claim, 
counterclaim or third-party claim within it, upon 
(i) the transferee court’s suggestion of remand, 
(ii) the Panel's own initiative by entry of an order to show cause, a 
conditional remand order or other appropriate order, or 
(iii) motion of any party. 
 95. See generally id. at Rule 10.3 (requiring additional showings if the 
transferee court does not initiate remand “[b]ecause the Panel is reluctant to 
order a remand absent the suggestion of the transferee judge”); In re Patenaude, 
210 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Deference is not abdication, however, and 
the presence or absence of a remand recommendation from the transferee judge 
as a factor in the Panel’s decision-making process seems to us entirely 
reasonable.”); In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 435 F. Supp. 930, 932 
(J.P.M.L. 1977) (“In the absence of a suggestion from the transferee judge for 
remand of these actions, however, we find the question of remand premature.”); 
In re Holiday Magic Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L. 
1977) (“In considering the question of remand, the Panel has consistently given 
great weight to the transferee judge’s determination that remand of a particular 
action at a particular time is appropriate because the transferee judge, after all, 
supervises the day-to-day pretrial proceedings.” (citing In re IBM Peripheral 
EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 407 F. Supp. 254, 256 (J.P.M.L. 1976))); Weigel, 
supra note 34, at 583–84 (“In the exercise of that [remand] power, the Panel 
defers to the views of the transferee judge. Absent a recommendation of remand 
from the transferee judge, any party advocating remand bears an especially 
heavy burden.”). In In re Baseball Bat Antitrust Litigation, the Panel did remand 
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assignments, as a matter of practice, the Panel refuses to “look over 
the shoulders of [its] transferee judges” for fear of “severely 
compromis[ing] [its] ability to attract [them].”96 
Appellate judges further reinforce this single-gatekeeper system 
in two ways. First, they review the Panel’s decisions only upon a 
writ of mandamus and subject those decisions to the clear error 
standard.97 So, if the Panel ignores cases that disappear into an 
abyss of multidistrict litigation, the appellate courts offer no 
alternative recourse. Second, the appellate courts have liberally 
interpreted the standard that transferee judges can hold on to cases 
for pretrial purposes by observing that “coordination can be found 
even if common issues are present only in relation to cases that 
have already terminated”98 and “overlapping issues do not 
necessarily need to touch the petitioners’ particular cases.”99  
Under this rationale, even once the parties complete common 
discovery and have only case-specific discovery remaining, the 
transferee judge can hold a case hostage as long as she wants. This 
creates a powerful settlement tool, but undermines the Supreme 
Court’s Lexecon decision.100 In Lexecon, the Court explained that 
section 1407 uses mandatory nomenclature dictating that the Panel 
“shall” remand actions once pretrial proceedings conclude unless 
those cases were terminated.101 Even though this result is supposed 
                                                                                                             
 
the entirety of a case as opposed to following the transferee judge’s suggestion 
that it remand only one claim. See 112 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (J.P.M.L. 2000). 
 96. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 31. 
 97. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2012) (“No proceedings for review of any order of 
the panel may be permitted except by extraordinary writ pursuant to the 
provisions of title 28, section 1651, United States Code.”); In re Wilson, 451 
F.3d 161, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We have observed that because of the ‘great 
weight’ that the JPML places upon an MDL court’s suggestion of remand, ‘only 
those plaintiffs who actually sought suggestion of remand from the [MDL] court 
have satisfied the first prong of the mandamus inquiry.’” (quoting Patenaude, 
210 F.3d at 142)). 
 98. Wilson, 451 F.3d at 170; Patenaude, 210 F.3d at 146 (holding that 
“because individual settlement negotiations and conferences are ongoing in the 
plaintiffs’ individual cases, and because the transferee court is conducting 
discovery on overlapping issues that affect many asbestos cases, even if not the 
plaintiffs’, coordinated pretrial proceedings have not concluded”). 
 99. Wilson, 451 F.3d at 170 (3d Cir. 2006). Cf In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (“The exercise of that 
[remand] discretion generally turns on the question of whether the case will 
benefit from further coordinated proceedings as part of the MDL.” (citing In re 
Air Crash Disaster, 461 F. Supp. 671, 672–73 (J.P.M.L. 1978))). 
 100. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 
(1998). 
 101. Id. at 35. 
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to be “impervious to judicial discretion,”102 circuit courts have read 
it in conjunction with Rule 16, which allows judges to facilitate 
settlement conferences.103 The result endows transferee judges 
with near eternal pretrial authority that persists long after joint 
discovery and uniform pretrial rulings have ceased.  
So, even though Congress saw it fit to give the Panel the power 
to remand cases at a party’s behest,104 in practice, the three roads to 
remand—at the transferee court’s suggestion, the Panel’s own 
initiative, or by motion of any party—have converged to one. 
Remand occurs only if the transferee judge suggests it. And 
transferee judges prefer to avoid remand and the stigma of 
“failure” that accompanies it. Thus, when a transferee judge clings 
to cases in hopes of coercing a settlement,105 there is no path 
around the bottleneck.106  
III. LIBERATING CASES THROUGH REMAND 
In theory, the bottleneck should not exist. Even before the 
Supreme Court’s admonishment in Lexecon, the Panel recognized 
that transferee judges will not “necessarily complete all pretrial 
proceedings,” but “will conduct the common pretrial proceedings.”107 
Of course, practice has proven otherwise.  
Nevertheless, there are some indications that change may be 
underway. The chairman of the Panel, Judge John G. Heyburn, has 
stated: 
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. 
 103. Patenaude, 210 F.3d at 144–46. Some trial courts have taken a more 
limited view. See, e.g., In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 276 F.R.D. 336, 339 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (“Matters related to the 
administration of individual trials—or matters that relate to only a few cases—
should be decided by the court that will actually conduct the trial. The purpose 
of an MDL is to foster efficiency by having a single judge address and decide 
issues that will apply to all (or at least a significant number of) the transferred 
cases.”). 
 104. The party requesting remand has the burden of demonstrating that 
remand is appropriate. See In re Integrated Res., Inc. Real Estate Ltd. P’ships. 
Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y 1994) (citing In re Holiday Magic 
Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L. 1977)). 
 105. See generally In re Activated Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing Mktg. & 
Sales Practices Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (D. Minn. 2012) (“Efforts to 
effect a global settlement may provide a sufficient basis for keeping transferred 
actions in an MDL court, but in light of the previous failed attempts, settlement 
appears unlikely under the circumstances here.” (citation omitted)). 
 106. In contrast, courts can and have considered remand sua sponte. See, e.g., 
id. at 1201 (ordering remand to transferor courts sua sponte). 
 107. In re Evergreen Valley Project Litig., 435 F. Supp. 923, 924 (J.P.M.L. 
1977) (emphasis added). 
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We are well aware that, in certain MDL dockets, the parties 
have vigorously disputed whether cases should be remanded 
to the transferor courts. We have adopted a more proactive 
approach to these concerns. We have emphasized to 
transferee judges that, unlike their judicial appointment, an 
MDL assignment need not extend for a lifetime. We are 
encouraging judges to consider remand where their basic 
work is completed.108 
Moreover, Judge Eduardo C. Robreno, who presided over the 
federal asbestos multidistrict litigation, and Judge Mark Davidson, 
who handled all Texas state court asbestos litigation, have 
embraced and advocated the fundamental idea of disaggregating 
cases.109  
To incite these tentative steps toward remand, this Part urges 
the Panel and transferee judges to consider two additional 
measures. First, the Panel should seriously consider parties’ 
remand requests even when the transferee judge does not support 
them. Second, transferee judges should routinely entertain a 
suggestion for remand by a party or initiate them sua sponte as 
soon as discovery on common issues concludes and only case-
specific issues remain. 
The first measure—encouraging the Panel to actively consider 
motions to remand from the parties even when they lack the 
transferee judge’s blessing—is designed to remedy the bottleneck 
that current practice creates. Without rejuvenating this avenue for 
recourse, the concern that “the [P]anel has abdicated its proper 
role” will persist.110 As long as the Panel continues to “reward” 
transferee judges who quickly settle cases with new multidistrict 
litigation assignments and quietly bemoan the rest, transferee 
judges will prefer to keep assignments as long as it takes to 
browbeat the parties into settling. And, while the second measure 
is designed to destigmatize remand as a failure, norms do not shift 
overnight. Parties need immediate recourse from a system that 
flattens review into a single source: the transferee judge.  
Congress expressly gave the Panel this reviewing function. 
Despite the Panel’s protests to the contrary,111 it need not speculate 
                                                                                                             
 108. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 32. 
 109. Vairo, supra note 20, at 1057–59. 
 110. Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 5, at 31. 
 111. E.g., In re Brand-Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 170 F. Supp. 
2d 1350, 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2001) (deferring to the transferee judge as to when to 
remand because she has special insight into the question of whether further 
coordinated or consolidated proceedings are likely to be useful) (citing In re 
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about the transferee judge’s motivations for keeping a case. Parties 
will typically first ask the transferee judge to suggest remand. This 
gives the judge an opportunity to explain her rationale for refusing 
to do so. And the adversarial nature of the process—with most 
controlling stakeholders opposing remand—would give the Panel a 
complete picture of the litigation’s development. It could thus 
police cases where transferee judges exceed multidistrict 
litigation’s scope and purpose. 
The second measure aims to make remand a standard feature of 
multidistrict litigation, at least as soon as common discovery 
concludes and the judge has ruled on motions that affect the cases 
uniformly. This combats the stigma that a transferee judge has 
somehow failed if she suggests that the Panel remand her cases. It 
serves as a signpost: the judge has fulfilled her mandate by 
ensuring common pretrial issues were handled on a coordinated, 
efficient basis, but centralization has now reached the point of 
diminishing returns. If the practice becomes routine, it may also 
serve to deter attorneys from filing weak claims in hopes of 
freeriding on lead lawyers’ efforts, which could result in global 
settlements that hew closely to a claim’s true value. 
Entertaining a suggestion of remand or proposing it sua sponte 
when common discovery ends resonates with transferee judges’ 
articulated rationales in the few cases they have remanded. For 
instance, transferee judges have asked the Panel to send cases back 
to their transferor districts when only case-specific discovery and 
motions remain,112 after denying class certification,113 when 
                                                                                                             
 
Holiday Magic Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L. 
1977)). 
 112. In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 145 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the Panel 
may remand “when everything that remains to be done is case-specific”); In re 
Activated Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 840 
F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (D. Minn. 2012); In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1407, 2004 WL 2034587, at * 2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 3, 
2004) (“[T]he transferee court typically does not rule on cumbersome, case-
specific legal issues.” (citing In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 
791 (N.D. Ohio 2004))); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 
1196, 1198 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (“[P]laintiff may renew her request for suggestion 
for remand, so long as it is accompanied by the certification that all discovery 
she intends to conduct in preparation for trial is complete or that her remaining 
discovery is entirely casespecific [sic].”); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. 
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1014, 1997 WL 109595, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1997) 
(declining to rule on summary judgment motions because the transferee court 
“would be putting itself in the shoes of the transferor courts”). 
 113. Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 (“Further, 
when transferred to this Court by the JPML, each Related Action potentially was 
a large class case, impacting dozens (if not hundreds or thousands) of plaintiffs 
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transferor courts should consider state-specific class actions,114 
when settlement talks fail,115 when a party declines to participate in 
a global settlement,116 and when a case is ready for trial.117 As 
several transferee judges observed, when courts refuse to remand 
cases after common discovery ends, they impede dispositive, case-
specific summary judgment motions that require intimate knowledge 
of state substantive law—the transferor judge’s specialty.118 
So, the second measure has two goals: (1) to pay more than lip 
service to the premise that multidistrict litigation is designed to 
resolve common issues and then remand cases for trial, and (2) 
                                                                                                             
 
who had purchased the defendants’ products. But the Court has denied class 
certification in each action, leaving nearly all of them as single-plaintiff cases.”). 
 114. In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 
77 (D. Me. 2011) (“There are only four remaining cases and in each, the 
Plaintiffs reasonably claim that the class certification issues present case-
specific questions unique to the state law of their respective jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, the transferor courts, each of which is familiar with the state law of 
their respective jurisdictions, are in a better position to assess the parties’ state 
law arguments and their impact on the class certification issue.”); In re Chrysler 
LLC 2.7 Liter V-6 Engine Oil Sludge Prods. Liab. Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 
1373 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (“We are presented with five putative statewide class 
actions for five different states under each state’s laws. While it is clear that 
discovery will overlap, class certification will vary. Therefore, the transferee 
judge may find that, eventually, the just and efficient conduct of these actions 
would best be served by suggesting to the Panel that the Panel remand these 
actions to the transferor courts for class certification considerations.”). But see 
Baltimore Cnty. v. AT&T Corp., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1098 (S.D. Ind. 2010) 
(“In this multi-district litigation, No. 1313, the court has presided over more 
than 40 state-wide class action settlements through final judgments and 
administration of the settlements.”). 
 115. Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (“In addition, 
the Court has undertaken several attempts to resolve this MDL in its entirety 
through settlement, without success (despite yeoman efforts by the Magistrate 
Judge). Efforts to effect a global settlement may provide a sufficient basis for 
keeping transferred actions in an MDL court, but in light of the previous failed 
attempts, settlement appears unlikely under the circumstances here.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 116. See, e.g., Baltimore Cnty., 735 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (remanding one 
remaining case that refused to settle). 
 117. In re Yamaha Motor Corp. Rhino ATV Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 
2d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (“When any transferred action becomes ready for 
trial, the transferee judge may suggest that the Panel remand the action to the 
transferor court.”). 
 118. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1663, 2009 WL 
1874085, at *3 (D.N.J. June 30, 2009) (remanding cases after completing 
common discovery to allow parties to file dispositive motions); In re Orthopedic 
Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1014, 1997 WL 109595, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 7, 1997) (declining to rule on summary judgment motions because the 
transferee court “would be putting itself in the shoes of the transferor courts”). 
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eliminate remand’s status as a second-best option, when global 
settlement talks fail. To be sure, there is nothing inherently wrong 
with settlement. But settlements should be the byproduct of 
vigorous litigation, not the endgame that they have become for the 
controlling stakeholders. When the litigation’s focal point is 
settlement, there is a significant danger that settlement furthers 
stakeholders’ interests at claimants’ expense and sacrifices the 
differences in state substantive laws along the way.  
CONCLUSION 
If the undercurrents of change are to take hold and make 
remand a viable option, the Panel and the transferee judges must be 
the ones to embrace and implement that shift. As this Article has 
explored, lead plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants gain little to 
nothing by having cases remanded to the transferor courts. But 
individual plaintiffs and (sometimes) their attorneys can suffer 
without remand, as can state substantive laws, procedural justice, 
and democratic participation opportunities.  
Remand can yield fairer compensation for those with strong 
claims by restoring claimants’ option to “see you in court,” and 
weeding out the weak cases that threaten to dilute compensation 
funds. Moreover, it can help ensure that defendants do not exploit 
the regulatory mismatch between a nationwide transferee forum 
and the state laws that often govern defendants’ conduct. In cases 
founded on state laws, like consumer protection and products 
liability, transferee judges should be more willing to remand so 
that transferor judges might decide whether defendants’ conduct 
can be best addressed—and deterred—through state-specific class 
actions or trial. Otherwise, multidistrict litigation will serve chiefly 
as settlement’s handmaiden and trial’s death knell. 
